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I think that Paul’s and my views are convergent on
the need to be context-specific and base transfer
selection on appropriate analysis. A good starting
point. However, there are some compelling issues on
which our views diverge.
First, I am not convinced by a line of argument that
implicitly makes food aid inappropriate because it is
the dominant or default in humanitarian
emergencies: in many such emergencies, food is the
most appropriate response, be that by default or
otherwise. If we exclude the unique post-Tsunami
experience, the evidence base for cash in
emergencies is somehow sparse and shows mixed
results. Then the implication that cash is necessarily
more appropriate in most emergencies is highly
questionable. As Paul recognises, ‘markets in
developing countries are often weak and poorly
integrated, and may be particularly constrained or
disrupted in conflicts and during natural disasters’. So
what is the basis to the claim that ‘cash-based
programming will continue to grow, probably at the
expense of in-kind mechanisms in some contexts’?
Put differently, where is the evidence that food
transfers were so widely inappropriate that cash
should be an alternative to (meaning a substitute for)
food? Even if I am not representing the World Food
Programme’s (WFP) view in this note, I am
personally glad that Paul often refers to Sharma
(2006), given that this WFP-supported study is the
most rigorous evaluation available of any cash
transfer initiative. However, Paul gives a distorted
picture when he uses it to support the evidence on
cash-for-nutrition (‘a switch from food to cash
benefits was not likely to affect consumption
significantly’): would anybody expect significant
changes in consumption patterns in just 3 months?
Second, I would not define cash as ‘threatening’
because it gives control to people. If it is argued that
food could be re-sold by people and the proceeds
used for any purpose (although less efficiently), then
any form of aid would eventually be more or less
threatening. Giving people control is not just a
matter of money. And even in that case, cash
provides choice but also transfers risk (of supply
failures) directly to people. In emergency contexts,
such risk is high. Contingency plans are supposed to
insure against that risk, but there are cases where
cash-based contingencies were neither effective for
people nor efficient for NGOs (e.g. Zambia 2005/6).
Arguably, more attention should be given to food-
based contingency plans.
Third, statements such as ‘the reluctance to consider
cash is also related to the underlying attitudes and
assumptions that humanitarian aid practitioners have
towards the people that they are trying to help’ are
unacceptable. To me, ‘inappropriate attitudes’ derive
from assuming knowledge of what is best for people
without consulting them and without undertaking
proper assessments. For example, the evaluation of
an Oxfam cash transfer scheme in Malawi reported
that ‘… despite the fact that the communities stated
a preference for food aid, Oxfam felt that [cash] was
an appropriate instrument to use and decided to go
ahead with the project’ (Savage and Umar 2006: 15).
If food aid had been provided, as requested by
people, it would have protected against the
subsequent price shocks that largely wiped out
people’s purchasing power. This is even more striking
if we consider that this pilot was designed without
having undertaken an ex ante market assessment.
Therefore, ‘inappropriate attitudes’ relate to the way
assistance is provided, and not to what is provided.
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